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Abstract—Medical device security is a growing concern for 
medical device manufacturers, healthcare delivery organisations 
and regulators in the industry. Increasingly, researchers are 
demonstrating exactly how vulnerable these devices are. In many 
cases, networked medical devices are regarded as a potential 
weak link within a healthcare IT network that could provide a 
means to expose the entire network to a malware attack. At 
present there is no formal method for implementing security risk 
management practices in the medical device industry. However, 
with new regulatory guidance being developed by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), medical devices manufacturers will 
need to prove that their devices are secure. This paper presents a 
security case framework that is currently under development. 
The purpose of this framework is to provide medical device 
manufacturers and healthcare delivery organisations with a 
solution to assist both in establishing confidence in the security 
assurance of medical devices and to also maintain this confidence 
throughout the lifetime of the device.  
Keywords—assurance cases; security cases; medical device 
security; cybersecurity; security capability argument pattern. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Over the past few years the use of interoperable and 
networked medical devices has increased dramatically. These 
medical devices have functionality to communicate via 
healthcare IT networks in a variety of different ways i.e. 
wirelessly, across the internet, and from device to device. With 
this increase in adoption and availability of interconnected 
medical devices, patients can now receive around-the-clock 
care, outside the healthcare environment, and even in the 
comfort of their own home. Consequently, resource demands to 
administer this patient care is significantly reduced. Healthcare 
delivery organisations utilize a wide range of networked 
medical devices from hard-wired monitoring devices such as 
diagnostic equipment (CT scanners) to implanted medical 
devices such as defibrillators. The benefits of networking these 
devices are significant but in using such technology, a new set 
of risks arise which can impact the safety of a patient. These 
are security risks, threats and vulnerabilities.  
Until now medical device manufacturers have only been 
required to demonstrate that their device is safe and effective. 
With the upcoming FDA cybersecurity regulatory guidance, 
manufacturers will now have to demonstrate that a medical 
device is also secure prior to placing it on the market [1]. In 
order to satisfy this requirement, it is recommended that 
manufacturers supply documentation detailing (1) the security 
risks identified during the design stage, (2) the security controls 
and justification of these controls to mitigate the risks, and (3) 
a traceability matrix linking the security controls to the security 
risks.   
This paper describes research being conducted to develop a 
framework to meet the requirements of this regulatory 
guidance through the use of assurance cases. Assurance cases 
are structured, evidence based arguments used to demonstrate 
confidence that a system holds a particular critical property. 
Assurance cases were originally used to address safety 
concerns for systems but the use of assurance cases has grown 
exponentially. Consequently, assurance cases are currently 
used to address other critical properties such as dependability, 
reliability and security across a range of safety critical domains 
such as automotive, railway, defence, aviation etc. Whenever 
assurance cases are used to argue safety and dependability they 
are referred to as safety cases and dependability cases 
respectively. Similarly, an assurance case arguing the security 
of a system/software is called a security case. 
Traditionally, assurance cases in the medical device domain 
have been used to address safety concerns [2]. Since April 
2010, Infusion Pump manufacturers have been operating under 
the Infusion Pump Improvement Initiative where a draft 
guidance document [3] recommends the use of assurance cases 
for use during the approval process for new Infusion Pumps 
entering the market. The FDA recommends the use of 
assurance cases to communicate information about the safety 
of the device and how risks have been identified and mitigated 
[3]. The objective of the research is to investigate how a 
security case framework can be adopted by both medical 
device manufacturers and healthcare delivery organisations to 
improve the overall security practices during both device 
development and operation, right through to retirement. 
II. OVERVIEW 
This framework leverages on a number of security related 
standards [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10] and utilises the 
concepts of Goal Structure Notation (GSN) and an argument 
pattern [11]. In this particular instance, security cases are 
intended to demonstrate confidence in the establishment of 
security capabilities (as outlined in IEC/TR 80001-2-2). It is 
difficult to argue that a system is secure [12] [13] beyond all 
doubt. Therefore, a more obtainable approach has been 
employed which argues that a number of security capabilities 
have been acceptably established using a risk based approach.  
IEC/TR 80001-2-2 - Application of risk management for 
IT-networks incorporating medical devices - Guidance for the 
communication of medical device security needs, risks and 
controls is a technical report which aims to promote the 
communication of security controls, needs and risks of medical 
devices to be incorporated into IT networks between medical 
device manufacturers, IT vendors and healthcare delivery 
organisations. This is the only guidance available to medical 
device manufacturers and healthcare organisations that 
specifically addresses security requirements for networked 
medical devices. The technical report presents an informative 
set of high level security capabilities which are intended to be 
the starting point for discussion between stakeholders. There 
are a total of 19 security capabilities (see Table I) which 
provide a template for a healthcare organisation to 
communicate their security requirements for a given medical 
device based on their needs taking into account operational 
environment, network infrastructure, interconnected devices, 
users etc. The aim is to facilitate more effective communication 
of the security requirements for a medical device. IEC/TR 
80001-2-2 security capabilities are the foundation of this 
framework. 
The security capabilities are intended to support the 
maintenance of confidentiality, integrity and availability which 
may otherwise be compromised intentionally or 
unintentionally. IEC/TR 80001-2-2, defines a security 
capability as “a broad category of technical, administrative 
and/or organisational security controls required to manage 
risks to confidentiality, integrity, availability and 
accountability of data and systems”. The security capabilities 
do not however provide sufficient detail for the specification of 
requirements but instead provide a classification and structure 
that can be used to organise such requirements [4]. A key 
component of this research was to determine how such security 
capabilities could be established through the implementation of 
a set of existing security controls. For this reason, the following 
security standards we selected (based on expert opinion) to 
identify these categories of security controls required to 
establish each of the security capabilities:  
• ISO 27799; 
• ISO/IEC 27002; 
• IEC 62443-3; 
• NIST SP 800-53; 
• ISO/IEC 15408-2; 
• ISO/IEC 15408-3.  
All relatable controls from each of the six standards were 
mapped to the 19 security capabilities. This work (lead by the 
authors and validated by the international medical device 
standards working group IEC SC62a JWG7) is currently at a 
committee draft stage and expected to be published as IEC/TR 
80001-2-8 [14] with the International Standards Committee 
IEC SC62a JWG7. This document presents the categories of 
security controls prescribed for a system to establish security 
capabilities to protect the confidentiality, integrity, availability 
and accountability of data and systems.  
 
 The security controls support the maintenance of 
confidentiality and protection from malicious intrusion both of 
which could potentially lead to compromises in integrity or 
system/data availability. An example of one of the security 
capabilities (automatic logoff -ALOF) and associated, mapped 
security controls is presented in Table II. Table II illustrates 
that there are a total of 25 technical, administrative, 
operational and management security across all 5 standards for 
ALOF. The selection of security controls for each security 
capability will be dependent upon the medical devices 
manufacturers’: defined acceptable risk tolerance; required 
rigour; preferable security standard/guidance resource; and the 
appropriateness of the security control etc. [15].  
 
Table I - IEC/TR 80001-2-2 security capabilities 
Code Security Capability Code Security Capability 
ALOF Automatic logoff MLDP Malware detection/prevention 
AUDT Audit Controls NAUT Node Authentication 
AUTH Authorization PAUT Person Authentication 
CNFS Configuration of Security Features PLOK 
Physical Locks on 
Device 
CSUP Cyber Security Product Upgrades SGUD Security Guides 
DTBK Data Backup and Disaster Recovery SAHD 
System and 
Application Hardening 
EMRG Emergency Access RDMP 
Third-Party 
Components in 
Product Lifecycle 
Roadmaps 
DIDT Health Data De-Identification TXCF 
Transmission 
Confidentiality 
IGAU 
Health Data 
Integrity and 
Authentication 
TXIG Transmission Integrity 
STCF 
Health Data 
Storage 
Confidentiality 
  
 
III. SECURITY ARGUMENT PATTERN 
 As mentioned, in the previous section, the security case 
comprises of a security capability argument pattern 
(throughout the remainder of this paper this will be referred to 
as a pattern). The pattern has been developed to: 1) reduce the 
complexity of the security case [16]; 2) reduce the likelihood 
of incomplete/inadequate arguments; and 3) with the inclusion 
of this information presented in the security case, it is 
anticipated that the integrity of the evidence is better 
understood. Patterns can also support the concept of re-usable 
arguments that can be recorded and retrieved for re-use within 
a security case for a particular medical device, or for multiple 
security cases with similar type risks associated with the 
design and use of multiple of medical devices. The pattern 
uses GSN notation and additional extensions as presented in 
[11]. 
 
Fig. 1 provides an overview of the pattern. 
 
• The pattern takes a risk-based approach and starts 
with a top-level argument claim (C2) addressing a 
particular security capability, in this example, 
automatic log off (ALOF). (C2, not C1 is used here 
as C1 will be the entire security case top level claim. 
See Section IV). 
• The pattern is applied to each of the 19 security 
capabilities regardless of whether the security 
capability is required or not. If a particular security 
capability is not required (C3) justification for non-
selection is required (J1). 
• Where the security capability is required, the pattern 
will be developed through C4 with the inclusion of 
supporting information at CTXT3. 
• At this point the strategy of the argument changes to 
address the identified risks (S1). In order to argue 
that all potential risks are mitigated, J2 should be 
instantiated to include, or refer to, a risk acceptance 
policy to justify the choice of risks to receive risk-
treatment. 
• C5 asserts the completeness of threat/vulnerability 
identification with CTXT4 instantiated to include the 
output of this process. 
• C6 claims that no unacceptable risks, as defined by 
the policy at J2, exist. 
• Where no unacceptable threats/vulnerabilities exist 
(n=0), Sn1 is instantiated otherwise, at C7, each of 
the threats requiring risk treatment are addressed 
individually. 
• Additional information regarding the cause or threat 
scenario for each individual risk should be detailed 
and instantiated at CTXT5. 
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Fig. 1.  Security Capability Argument Pattern 
 
Table II - Security controls for automatic logoff (ALOF) 
Standard Ref Control 
SP 800-53  AC-1 Access Control Policy and 
Management 
AC-11 Session Lock 
AC-12 Session termination 
IA-11 Re-authentication 
ISO/IEC 15408-2 FTA_SSL Session Locking and 
Termination 
FMT_SAE Security Attribute Expiration 
FIA_UAU User Authentication 
ISO/IEC 27002 5.1.1 Policies for information 
security 
5.1.2 Review of the Information 
Security Policy 
9.1.1 Access control policy 
9.4.2 Secure Log-On Procedures 
11.2.8 Unattended user equipment 
11.2.9 Clear desk and clear screen 
policy 
18.2.2 Compliance with Security Policies and Standards 
ISO 27799 7.2.1 Information Security Policy 
Document 
7.2.2 Review of the Information 
Security Policy 
7.8.1.2 Access Control Policy 
7.8.3 Unattended User Equipment 
7.8.3 Clear desk and Clear Screen 
Policy 
7.8.4 Secure Log-On Procedures 
7.8.4 Session Time-Out 
7.8.4 Limitation of Connection Time 
7.12.3 Compliance with Security Policies and Standards 
IEC 62443-3-3 SR 2.5 Session Lock 
SR 2.6 Remote session termination 
 
• The strategy of the argument changes once again at 
S2 to argue over the selection of mitigating controls 
for each of the identified risks requiring risk-
treatment. 
• CTXT6 should be instantiated with a reference to the 
source of the security control. In this case IEC/TR 
80001-2-8 is included; however, a medical device 
manufacturer may choose another source or guidance 
for selection of security controls. 
• Finally, at C8 the claim relates to each of the selected 
security controls.  
IV. SECURITY CASE 
In support of IEC/TR 80001-2-2 and the security 
capabilities, development of security cases are the key element 
of this framework for the interchange of security capability 
information between medical device manufacturers and 
healthcare delivery organisations. The purpose of this 
framework is to provide an end to end solution useful during 
development, certification and operation. 
 The pattern (presented in section III) constitutes only a 
subset of the security case. In addition to the components of the 
pattern depicted in Fig.1, there are a number of additional 
components required in order to complete the security case. 
These include: 
• The top-level claim (C1) – This is the overall claim 
and purpose of the security case which, in this case 
may be written as “All security capabilities have been 
acceptably established”. C1 is developed to include 
the underlying patterns for each of the 19 security 
capabilities; 
• Information regarding the medical device, its 
intended use, operational environment etc. should be 
included as context (CTXT1) at the top-level claim 
(C1). This information is valuable in terms of 
agreements between stakeholders and also to provide 
information to healthcare delivery organisations for 
optimal operational use post deployment; 
• Context (CTXT2) regarding assets, medical device 
system description, interfaces, boundaries etc. should 
also be included in a separate context component at 
the top-level claim. Again, this information supports 
ideal operational use; 
• Evidence (Sn#) or proof of the successful 
establishment of a security control. Evidence is the 
most crucial component of the security case which 
should be adequate, necessary and suitable [17] 
(connected to the lowest layer of sub-claims). 
 Security controls selected by the medical device 
manufacturers, may often be technical controls and evidence 
should be documented in the security case to demonstrate 
confidence in the establishment of those controls. This 
evidence may include results of testing, analyses or historical 
information.  However, as the intention is to develop a 
framework that is useable by both manufacturers and 
healthcare delivery organisations (end users), additional 
security controls may be required. In order to enable healthcare 
delivery organisations to maintain the security capability, 
further administrative or operational controls may be required. 
For example, consider the security capability “automatic 
logoff” where a risk of exposure to confidential health data 
exists without the capability. A medical device manufacturer 
may select authentication controls by enabling passwords or 
tokens. The manufacturer may also establish authentication 
failure handling controls to allow the system to disable after a 
number of incorrect log-on attempts. Results of tests carried 
out to ensure these controls have been correctly implemented 
are documented by the medical device manufacturer as 
evidence within the security case. In order to support these 
controls, a healthcare delivery organisation may develop an 
“authentication and identification” policy, therefore, providing 
additional evidence to support the establishment of the security 
capability automatic logoff.  
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 This paper presents a brief overview of ongoing work in 
the area of medical device security assurance within the 
Regulated Software Research Centre.  The security case 
framework incorporates a number of existing international 
standards, guidance documents and processes which have 
guided the development of the security argument pattern.  The 
security argument pattern has been structured in such a way to 
provide regulators and healthcare delivery organisations with a 
comprehensive matrix showing the link between the security 
risks, associated causes, the mitigating security controls and 
evidence of those controls being implemented to establish the 
security capability.  
 In addition to developing a catalogue of security controls 
relating to the security capabilities, a vulnerability database is 
currently being developed. This ‘live’ database will provide a 
link between each of the 19 security capabilities, their 
associated vulnerabilities and mitigating controls. The purpose 
of this is to develop a security case repository to inform 
medical devices manufacturers during security risk 
management activities. 
 The catalogue of security controls is currently being 
validated by a working group of international security experts 
and also experts from the International Standards Committee 
IEC SC62a. It is expected that this will be published as 
IEC/TR 80001-2-8. A new work item proposal has also been 
raised by the authors within the same International Standards 
Committee to publish a second technical report (TR). This TR, 
IEC/TR 80001-2-9 - Application risk management for IT 
networks incorporating medical devices – Part 2-9: 
Application guidance – Guidance for use of security 
assurance cases to demonstrate confidence in IEC/TR 80001-
2-2 security capabilities [18] has recently been drafted and 
submitted for ballot and comments. The TR presents a 
framework for developing the security cases to establish 
confidence in the security capabilities outlined in IEC/TR 
80001-2-2. 
 In terms of developing, interpreting and updating the 
security cases, the framework will also be validated in 
industry both with medical device manufacturers and 
healthcare delivery organisations located both in Europe and 
the US.  
 In the medical device domain, a gap exists as there is no 
standardised way to assist organisations to satisfy new security 
related requirements [19]. Therefore, the objective of this 
research is to investigate this gap further and provide a 
solution to benefit the following: 
• Medical device manufacturers; as they will be soon 
be required to demonstrate evidence that a medical 
device is secure both from a development and a final 
product perspective [1]. One of the main aims of this 
research is to provide a framework to assist 
manufacturers to demonstrate and communicate the 
security capability of medical devices. 
• Healthcare delivery organisations; they have been 
frustrated for years with medical device 
manufacturers and vendors who refuse to address the 
security issues that medical devices create in a timely 
manner [20] [21]. Medical device security is 
becoming increasingly important for healthcare 
delivery organisations as they are responsible for the 
security assurance of devices on their networks [22]  
[23] [24]. This research addresses the needs of the 
healthcare delivery organisations through the 
integration of security cases as part of their on-site 
risk management process. 
 At present, there is no formal method for addressing 
security practices within the medical device industry.  This is 
the primary focus of this research and so it is expected that the 
output of this research will positively impact the medical 
device domain in both the EU and the US by building 
awareness of security vulnerabilities, threats and related risks 
between the healthcare delivery organisations and medical 
device manufacturers. 
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